In 2015, there were more than 21 million refugees globally; as conflicts continue and globalization expands, it is advantageous for planners to strategically manage population influxes of ill-equipped families. Refugee policy decisions have imperative effects on housing markets, economies, segregation, international relations, and refugees' resilience. Bound by the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, every member state is obligated to protect refugees. This paper analyzes the varying conditions of refugees in the top six countries with the highest number of refugees; through a matrix, this paper compares what attributes promote effective refugee plans and which do not. Every conflict scenario is unique, and there are attributes that a refugee plan cannot change (length of conflict, host country's economy, status of host country's government, cultural clashes between local population and refugees). However, this paper seeks to empower planners to use policy in ways they can mitigate current and future refugee situations. This analysis concludes that refugee policies work best for the host country and the refugees when refugees: 1) are able to live outside of camps and in cities; 2) can be employed; 3) are distributed to not overwhelm housing/infrastructure; and there are multiple funding sources.
Advances in Applied Sociology
vowed that these human rights violations would never occur again. The UN was established, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written in 1948.
This was the first internationally recognized document to define the "right to seek asylum" (United Nations, 1948) . The (Fourth) Geneva Conventions of 1950 included the protection of refugees during times of war. This binding convention means that a government cannot treat refugees as aliens or enemies while said government experiences war (Geneva Convention, 1950) . The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 was soon followed by the first UN document devoted specifically to refugees. This legislation boldly concluded that states must grant refugees rights that are equal to foreign nationals living in said state or equal to national citizens. The 1951 Convention is arguably the most fundamental document to define the roles and responsibilities that host countries inherit and to define the rights, which refugees bear (United Nations, 1951) . The weakness of the 1951 Convention is that it only defines refugees from events preceding 1951 (essentially the events of World War II) and was regarded as a Eurocentric responsibility. Suddenly, there were refugees from non-European theatres, and these regulations did not apply. This loophole was amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which nullified the limitations of the 1951 Convention's assumptions; ergo international refugee law finally applied to any person in any place at any time (United Nations, 1967) . There are countless UN documents that resemble unfeasible dreams rather than tangible obligations. Apart from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these papers are considered globally authorized, international law and not heart-warming aspirations.
Historical precedents built the construction of refugee norms just as much as official UN documents. Succeeding World War II, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) sought to manage refugee resettlement and stimulate the economy back to into Europe. The UNRRA was organized by the Allied powers, but primarily by the United States. It was comprehensive and effective but ran out of funding after only four years (Holocaust Encyclopedia, 2017) . The International Refugee Organization briefly took the UNRRA's place only to be replaced again by the UNCHR in 1950.
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was the first substantial refugee resettlement project using modern refugee law. The majority of the 200 thousand Hungarian refugees fled to Austria. Austria quickly called upon the international European community to contribute equally to this refugee crisis:
Austria will therefore take into consideration the number of displaced persons to be received in proportion to the total population of Austria, and will compare that to the corresponding proportions in the other Member States in order to ensure that the burden is shared equally between all the EU Member States (Zieck, 2013: p. 62 ).
There was debate over how many states must "share the burden". The reset- This refugee population was mostly young and could fill a void in labor. Amidst the Cold War ideology, the US and other democratic powers offered freedom to these freedom-fighters; these refugees had valuable inside information on the Soviet regime; and the conflict was short-lived with a clear ending (Zieck, 2013) .
Signing up to support refugees for a short-lived conflict is much more attractive than signing up for a decade-long conflict.
In 1975, the Vietnam War ended, which commenced a massive departure of Vietnamese refugees, primarily by boat. The lines of who was a refugee and who was an economic migrant became blurry as this exodus continued until 1988. More than 1 million Vietnamese left to start a new life outside their borders (Tran, 2015) .
The Comprehensive Action Plan was a coordinated resettlement strategy between Vietnam and western powers, which limited the number of people who qualified as refugees. After a decade of funding resettlement programs, host countries had "compassion fatigue" and were looking for exceptions to these rules so they could be excused from their responsibilities. The "boat people" are not the first example of states using exceptions to the rules, but this crisis illustrates when arguments against complying with international refugee agreements become main-
stream.
Yet even "short" conflicts can be considered unattractive refugee obligations.
After an embarrassing, failed-attempt of humanitarian peacekeeping in Somalia, Bill Clinton could not muster the congressional support to aid Rwanda before it was too late. Rwanda was not considered a geostrategic ally, and it does not have resources the US was hoping to exploit. Not reacting fast enough to prevent a genocide was equally embarrassing as Somali pirates were hijacking US aid. Some consider this lack of effort as racism, while others interpret this as merely political. Table 1 charts generalized refugee recovery trends throughout three historical phases.
Current Refugee Policy Patterns

International Distribution of Resources
Despite a country's good intentions of actually implementing policies to help for. This analysis discusses these scenarios to materialize patterns and tendencies of which planners should take note.
Ethiopia
Define abbreviations and acronyms the first time they are used in the text, even
State newspapers claim the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is taking exceptional care of their 736 thousand refugees; however, this is simply not accurate. The unstable government of the country merely does not possess the capability to effectively protect its citizens, let alone thousands of refugees. The longstanding drought has devastated its agriculture-based economy, and political unrest compounds Ethiopia's refugee crisis. Despite Ethiopia having the lowest Figure 1 . Pie charts depicting the UNHCR's budget distribution; this illustrates how some countries receive more resources than others. The data is from the UNHCR Financial Report. Questions on the quantity and sources of funding are important questions but further discussion on finances is outside the scope of this paper (UNHCR, 2017). (Jeffery, 2015) . Most of the refugee camps are outside of main cities, making the ratio between native populations and displaced populations disproportionately high. This counters the 1951 Convention, which guarantees freedom of movement and employment. Ethiopia's largest refugee camp, in Gambella, has 270,000 refugees and 300,000 native residents (Boradhurst, 2016) . Refugees escaping violence in South Sudan could easily bring guns into the refugee camps in Gambella (Soloman, 2016 
Lebanon
The Lebanese Republic has 1.1 million refugees living among its small population of roughly 4.5 million citizens, resulting in a staggering 208.91 refugees-per-1000-citizens (United Nations Refugee Data, 2015) . Although the GDP ratio is better than most in this study 80.83, Lebanon is beyond overwhelmed with the incoming Syrian population. The government has made the process of registering as a refugee extensive and difficult to deter the number of vulnerable people they are responsible for supporting. The burden of refugee planning is so intimidating; the government attempts to ignore it as much as possible. According to the UNHCR, Lebanon has received only 2% of the funding it requested to as- 
Pakistan
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan hosts 1.6 million refugees. Comparing the number of refugees to Pakistan's bountiful population, its refugees-per-1000-citizens is only 8.33. However, the GPD to refugee ratio is 322.47, which limits Pakistan's ability to serve and protect asylum seekers and its own citizens.
In the 1970s, Pakistan openly welcomed Afghans escaping the Soviet invasion. 
Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran followed a similar refugee policy-path to Pakistan.
Iran hosts 979 thousand refugees, with a 12.53 refugees-per-1000-citizens ratio.
This means Iran has the fourth largest refugee population in the world. Unlike . Iran has implemented repatriation efforts similar to Pakistan, but with far fewer refugees deciding to return to Afghanistan. Perhaps this is because, although there is discrimination in Iran, it provides more opportunity than Afghanistan. Here, refugees prioritize resources over social harmony, which is not the case in Turkey and other places.
Refugees are not a new concept for Iran. Integrating them in cities is not the issue; instead, refugees must hurdle over bureaucratic loopholes that prevent people from registering as refugees. For generational cases like Iran, one must ask for exactly how long should a person be a registered refugee? Should refugee children not born in the "home country" be counted in social programs? Iran has yet to answer these important questions.
Jordan
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has 664 thousand refugees, making its refugees-per-1000-citizens ratio the second highest of this study at 89.55. Fortunately, Jordan has the second-best refugee-GDP ratio (United Nations Refugee Data, 2015). Jordan's approach to its current refugees is evolving as its resources and generosity grow weary. Initially, all refugees could settle into their cities and start their new lives alongside Jordanians. Influxes of refugees are routine to Jordan;
Syrian refugees settling in Jordan was not shocking or unwelcomed, at first. After several years, the housing market, job demand, and need for schools exploded.
In 2012, the government started to limit the number of refugees by placing them in camps. Currently, refugees need a sponsor to live in cities (Fröhlich et al., 2015) .
Despite these restrictions, 80% of the refugees live outside the camps (Ingrasci et al., 2015) . However, when living outside, it is difficult to find consistent work, and food is only distributed at schools for children. Recently, refugees have begun to encounter "random-ID checks" to confirm that they are allowed to be outside of camps. In the camps, shelter and food are accounted for.
The camps, particularly the Za'atari camp, have morphed into semi-functioning cities. Za'atari is the second-largest refugee camp in the world, and, at one point, was Jordan's "fourth largest city" (Ingrasci et al., 2015) . This camp has an informal economy from smuggled in goods. Za'atari's economy has brought on a sense of belonging and purpose to its residents internally, and it contributes to the greater Jordanian economy as well. UN workers know these informal exchanges are occurring, but they mostly permit it, seeing it as an opportunity to jump-start a shrinking city (Kimmelman, 2014) .
Despite the increased demands for housing and jobs, the relationship of Jordanians with refugees is positive overall. Refugees are a normalized occurrence;
Syrians and Jordanians both speak Arabic and are mostly Sunni Muslim. The royal monarchy continues to appear devoted to aiding its Muslim brothers and sisters. The welcoming, integrated approach, along with being used to refugees, having a decent GDP, and sharing the same culture, all contribute to a relatively 
Turkey
The Like Lebanon, refugees in Turkey can make daily choices for their family and contribute to local economies (Sreenivasan, 2017) . On paper, Syrians have access to Turkish healthcare, schools, and work permits. However, these amenities and opportunities are mostly available in the large cities where rent is really expensive. Economically and culturally, the Syrian refugees fit into the southeastern, Kurdish region of Turkey. Unfortunately, these towns are small and cannot hold all of these people. The mayor of a town called Kilis explained that, "Before the crisis, street cleaners collected 30 tons of rubbish a day; now it is 160. Water consumption has tripled; the amount of green space per person has shrunk from five square meters to just over one" (Richard, 2016) .
Overall, Turkey's refugee system is relatively good, but would be more effective if the "provided services" like health and education, were in the places where refugees lived. These refugees cannot use these resources as long as they do not have access to them. With more attention and investment, the cities of Turkey's southeastern region could support these needs and stimulate long lasting growth.
Unfortunately, Turkey's government has other priorities and internal dilemmas.
Application to Future Policy
What can planners and policy-makers learn from this research? Firstly, this paper notes that there is no completely transferable "formula" for refugee crisis policy creation. Every country has a different history, relationship with said incoming population, autonomy, budget, amount of international support, set of priorities, and population sizes. A number of these attributes simply cannot change due to a proposed plan when confronted by hundreds of years of history between peoples, religious differences, duration of conflict time, etcetera.
However, by comparing these six approaches, one can see a few overarching positive, transferable policies, which could be similarly used in different contexts. For instance, refugees do arguably better when they are structurally, economically, and socially integrated with the local population. Cards with monthly stipends allow families to participate in the local economy while making decisions on how to spend their money and feed their children. Getting refugees out of prison-like camps and into local shops, schools, and streets gives them dignity For these integrated policies to materialize, a host country must accept a refugee population as new permanent residents, and not as a temporary favor. Most of the time, countries absolutely do not want to adopt a refugee population as their own residents. This hesitation in absorbing refugees has dwindled as the proportional assumption, in which the international community collectively adopts vulnerable peoples in relation to their capability, is no longer a trend. The attitude toward the Hungarian refugees in 1956 entirely diverges from the attitudes and assumptions of today. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees endures on paper, yet is nullified in practice. Perhaps if the international community continued to take proportional responsibility for refugee resettlement, then countries would not resist these incoming populations.
Considering that presently, shifting refugee populations are not proportional to population, space, or budget, host countries must withstand quick demographic changes. In a practical sense, it is cumbersome to adjust labor and housing markets, school distributions, sewer lines, bus routes, roads, political precincts, and more. Perhaps a greater stymie to admitting a refugee population is cultural clashes. Inviting a new people into an area means potentially losing cultural identity. New languages, social practices, food demands, and political priorities follow immigrant populations. When the refugee and host country's cultures dramatically differ, locals feel culturally threatened. This threat is compounded if there is an actual history of violence between said groups. For instance, the Nuer and Anuyak peoples in Ethiopia have experienced intermittent conflict for centuries; one can see why Ethiopia chooses to keep their refugees separated from society, in camps. Depending on the situation, the refugees themselves may also not want to integrate with the locals. Many Syrian refugees emphasize their plan is to move back to Syria. Syrians in Turkey prefer living in the southern, Kurdish region for cultural reasons, even though western Turkey has more employment and resources. They see the discrimination in Europe, and they do not want to move there, fearing their children would lose their Muslim identity.
This phenomenon is not unique to these host countries, but is found everywhere. Za'atari camp in Jordan serves as a model, although these populations get along culturally. Za'atari has informal work within the camp and contributes to the greater economy outside. This camp is so established that one can find two restaurants with ratings and reviews on Google Maps within it. These compounds could provide employment opportunities within the camp and trade these goods outside the site. Camps could become temporary, independent, and quasi-selfsupporting cities. This would give refugees a sense of purpose.
The author of this paper invites further research on these complicated and nuanced refugee models. Certainly, this analysis does not encompass all refugee experiences and planning; however, this offers insight to how the international community could improve conditions for millions of vulnerable people by recognizing what conditions tend to produce effective and ineffective policies.
